So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time . The concerns of Parents Involved are illustrated by Jill Kurfirst, who sought to enroll her ninth-grade son, Andy Meeks, in Ballard High Schools special Biotechnology Career Academy. It defines the democratic element as an interest in producing an educational environment that reflects the pluralistic society in which our children will live. Post, at 39. This conclusion is divorced from any evaluation of the actual impact of the plans at issue in these casesother than to note that the plans often have no effect. Post, at 46. 05908, at 42a. 1986). Arkansas, for example, provides by statute that [n]o student may transfer to a nonresident district where the percentage of enrollment for the students race exceeds that percentage in the students resident district. Ark. in Brown v. Board of Education, O.T. 1952, No. In Brown, this Court held that the governments segregation of schoolchildren by race violates the Constitutions promise of equal protection. 06AppsChoicesBoardApril2005final.pdf. Although the matter was the subject of disagreement on the Court, see id., at 346347 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id., at 382383 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id., at 388392 (Kennedy, J., dissenting), the majority concluded that the law school did not count back from its applicant pool to arrive at the meaningful number it regarded as necessary to diversify its student body. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 26869. Post, at 41. Meredith joined a pending lawsuit filed by several other plaintiffs. Cf. See 448 U. S., at 539. I shall not accept the school boards assurances on faith, cf. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 Ibid. on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit. [Footnote 13] See Jenkins, 515 U. S., at 121122 (Thomas, J., concurring) ([T]here is no reason to think that black students cannot learn as well when surrounded by members of their own race as when they are in an integrated environment). Before Brown, the most prominent example of an exemplary black school was Dunbar High School. 2, p. 79 (But be that doctrine what it may, somewhere, sometime to every principle comes a moment of repose when it has been so often announced, so confidently relied upon, so long continued, that it passes the limits of judicial discretion and disturbance. . This Courts opinion in McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U. S. 39 (1971), fits comfortably within this framework. 1. Schools argue that a diverse environment teaches students tolerance and respect, and the exposure to diverse viewpoints enhances education and dispels stereotypes. . After all, this Court has in many cases explicitly permitted districts to use target ratios based upon the districts underlying population. 2, p. 83 (It [South Carolina] is confident of its good faith and intention to produce equality for all of its children of whatever race or color. The Court split 414 on key aspects of the case, with Justice Kennedy writing the swing vote opinion and agreeing with four Justices (Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito) that the programs used by Seattle and Louisville did not pass constitutional muster (because the districts failed to demonstrate that their plans were sufficiently narrowly tailored), but Kennedy also found, along with four Justices (Breyer, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg), that compelling interests exist in avoiding racial isolation and promoting diversity. The third tiebreaker was the distance from the students home to the school, and the final tiebreaker was a lottery, which was seldom used. Regardless of the constitutional validity of such remediation, see Croson, supra, at 524525 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment), it does not apply here. There has been considerable interest in this case, as demonstrated by the extraordinary number (approximately sixty) of amicus briefs filed in the case. For this reason, among others, I do not join Parts IIIB and IV. As the district fails to account for the classification system it has chosen, despite what appears to be its ill fit, Seattle has not shown its plan to be narrowly tailored of Ed., 476 U. S. 267, 277 (1986) (plurality opinion). schoolId=1043&reportLevel=School&orgLinkId=1043& Most non-white families live south of downtown, where five high schoolsChief Sealth, Cleveland, Franklin, Garfield, and Rainier Beachare located. The Western District of Washington dismissed the suit, upholding the tiebreaker. PDF The Interdependence of Housing and School Segregation Id., at 338, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 156 L. Ed. No one here disputes that Louisvilles segregation was de jure. Independent School Dist., 719 S.W. 2d 350, 352353 (Tex. It is even more difficult to accept the pluralitys contrary view, namely that the underlying plan was unconstitutional. A comparison of the test results of the 2, 4, 5 (WD Ky. 1999) (Hampton I). Thus, more nonwhite students (107, 27, and 82, respectively) who selected one of these three schools as a top choice received placement at the school than would have been the case had race not been considered, and proximity been the next tiebreaker. 6. See, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U. S. 899, 909910 (1996) ([A]n effort to alleviate the effects of societal discrimination is not a compelling interest); Croson, supra, at 498499; Wygant, 476 U. S., at 276 (plurality opinion) (Societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified remedy); id., at 288 (OConnor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ([A] governmental agencys interest in remedying societal discrimination, that is, discrimination not traceable to its own actions, cannot be deemed sufficiently compelling to pass constitutional muster). Brief for Respondent at 24, 30, 33. App. 161, 170, 212 A. Order No. The same must be said for the controlling opinion in Grutter. The minimal effect these classifications have on student assignments, however, suggests that other means would be effective. In Grutter, in the context of law school admissions, we found that these types of interests were, constitutionally speaking, compelling. See 539 U. S., at 330 (recognizing that Michigan Law Schools race-conscious admissions policy promotes cross-racial understanding, helps to break down racial stereotypes, and enables [students] to better understand persons of different races, and pointing out that the skills needed in todays increasingly global marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints (internal quotation marks omitted; alteration in original)). The question was originally brought up by the Ninth Circuit independently of the parties (377 F.3d 949 at 958) and the School District has now adopted that argument as its own before the Court. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 (1978); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986); Richmond v. J. Even if the dicta from Swann were entitled to the weight the dissent would give it, and no dicta is, it not only did not address the question presented in Swann, it also does not address the question presented in these caseswhether the school districts use of racial classifications to achieve their stated goals is permissible. The district retained a racial tiebreaker for oversubscribed schools, which takes effect only if the schools minority or majority enrollment falls outside of a 30% range centered on the minority/majority population ratio within the district. . See Harrell, School Web Site Removed: Examples of Racism Sparked Controversy, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, June 2, 2006, p. B1. The compelling interest at issue here, then, includes an effort to eradicate the remnants, not of general societal discrimination, ante, at 23 (plurality opinion), but of primary and secondary school segregation, see supra, at 7, 14; it includes an effort to create school environments that provide better educational opportunities for all children; it includes an effort to help create citizens better prepared to know, to understand, and to work with people of all races and backgrounds, thereby furthering the kind of democratic government our Constitution foresees. 7045 and 7291 (WD Ky., July 30, 1975) (1975 Judgment and Findings). 1, this Court struck down a state referendum that effectively barred implementation of Seattles desegregation plan and burden[ed] all future attempts to integrate Washington schools in districts throughout the State. Id., at 462463, 483. The issue here is whether the constitution permits, rather than prohibits, voluntary State action aimed toward reducing and eventually eliminating de facto school segregation. The opinion of the Court and Justice Breyers dissenting opinion (hereinafter dissent) describe in detail the history of integration efforts in Louisville and Seattle. 2d 304. The only counter argument in the record is the Ninth Circuits resolution of the question. Nothing in the extensive history of desegregation efforts over the past 50 years gives the districts, or this Court, any reason to believe that another method is possible to accomplish these goals. See generally Washington v. Seattle School Dist. 2830 (cataloging state laws requiring separa- When formulating the plans under review, both districts drew upon their considerable experience with earlier plans, having revised their policies periodically in light of that experience. App. No. The judgments of the Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and Ninth Circuits are reversed, and the cases are 05908, at 7. It first appeared in Plessy, where the Court asked whether a state law providing for segregated railway cars was a reasonable regulation. 163 U. S., at 550. Andy was accepted into this selective program but, because of the racial tiebreaker, was denied assignment to Ballard High School. The District argues that its use of race in high school admissions serves three compelling government interests: (1) the educational benefits of a diverse student body; (2) the reduction of racial isolation and de facto segregation; and (3) providing equality of opportunity to all students. The wide variety of different integration plans that school districts use throughout the Nation suggests that the problem of racial segregation in schools, including de facto segregation, is difficult to solve. 05908, pp. The other plaintiffs all challenged assignments to certain specialized schools, and the District Court found these assignments, which are no longer at issue in this case, unconstitutional. The dream of a Nation of equal citizens in a society where race is irrelevant to personal opportunity and achievement would be lost in a mosaic of shifting preferences based on inherently unmeasurable claims of past wrongs. Id., at 505506. Today, they do not. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000). See, e.g., Brief for Respondents in No. Second, the distinction between de jure segregation (caused by school systems) and de facto segregation (caused, e.g., by housing patterns or generalized societal discrimination) is meaningless in the present context, thereby dooming the pluralitys endeavor to find support for its views in that distinction. The issue in Gratz arose, moreover, in the context of college admissions where students had other choices and precedent supported the proposition that First Amendment interests give universities particular latitude in defining diversity. Id. So long as the plan is narrowly tailored, meaning that it uses the least restrictive means to obtain the benefits that flow from diversity and implements a plan that does not result in an impermissible quota, school districts can have some say in the racial make-up of their student body. These other meanse.g., where to construct new schools, how to allocate resources among schools, and which academic offerings to provide to attract students to certain schoolsimplicate different considerations than the explicit racial classifications at issue in these cases, and we express no opinion on their validitynot even in dicta. For the plurality now to insist as it does, ante, at 2728, that these school districts ought to have said so officially is either to ask for the superfluous (if they need only make explicit what is implicit) or to demand the impossible (if they must somehow provide more proof that there is no hypothetical other plan that could work as well as theirs). Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 The board opposed dissolution, arguing that the old dual system had left a demographic imbalance that prevent[ed] dissolution. In 2000, after reviewing the present plan, the District Court dissolved the 1975 order. Finally, the kind of deference that the Supreme Court will give the School District will also have implications. The view that a more lenient standard than strict scrutiny should apply in the present context would not imply abandonment of judicial efforts carefully to determine the need for race-conscious criteria and the criterias tailoring in light of the need. 05908, p.13, n.13. Even if this purported distinction, which Justice Stevens would adopt, post, at 2, n.3 (dissenting opinion), had not been already rejected by this Court, the distinction has no relevance to these cases, in which students of all races are excluded from the schools they wish to attend based solely on the racial classifications.